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**INDONESIA: A WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO PARTNERSHIP
AGAINST EXTREMISM**

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Contents

Introduction	1
Smart: Not Hard nor Soft	4
Partnering through Defense, Diplomacy, and Aid	7
Obstacles to Overcome	12
Conclusions	13
Recommendations	15
Bibliography	17

Abstract

Islamic extremism is not isolated to the Middle East. The current war on terror will not end as long as other locations foster radical Islamic principles. An Islamic caliphate that includes the Indonesian Archipelago is a desired end state for radical Islam. The presence of extremist organizations within Indonesia makes it a likely front to continue the war on terror.

The six-year hiatus in military-to-military engagement from 1999 to 2005 as well as other restrictions imposed by Congress have complicated the relationship between the United States and Indonesia. These restrictions will make it difficult to “win hearts and minds” if Indonesia does become a center for radical Islam. Overcoming this history of unilateral restrictions requires a coordinated whole of government approach to strengthen diplomatic, informational, military and economic ties between the two countries.

In order to counter Indonesia’s potential development into a state for radical Islam, the United States must leverage the integration of Department of Defense bilateral relations, Department of State engagement, and Non-government Organization’s assistance through the use of smart power. Smart power will enable Indonesia and the United States to enhance a comprehensive partnership that is capable of enduring regional security and preventing a third front of Islamic Extremism.

Indonesia and America ...must begin to think hard about our 21st century partnership. We are entering an era where our relations will be more and more driven by the need to address global issues, as much as by the imperative to develop bilateral relations.

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
Indonesian President
Statement to USINDO 14 November 2008

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia, a country two hundred-forty million strong, is the fourth most populous nation in the world.¹ Eighty-eight percent professes Islam as their religion, making Indonesia the world's largest Muslim population and although is it nearly half way around the globe from Mecca - the spiritual center of the Islamic faith, Indonesia is part of the *ummat*, or global universal community.² This association by faith makes Indonesians subject to the same political ramifications facing Muslims worldwide.

On 12 October 2002, the second anniversary of the bombing of USS Cole, a network of terrorists within the borders of Indonesia struck Bali, a popular tourist destination for Westerners.³ Prior to this attack on Indonesian soil the typical Indonesian viewpoint was that the threat of Islamic extremism only existed in the United States. Indonesians' shared a sense of denial, reinforced by their government that radical Islam did not exist in Indonesia and there was no reason to be concerned.⁴ However, when the 202 lives were taken in the Bali bombing it was clear that an al Qaeda affiliated attack was not simply a western

¹ United States Department of State, "Background Note: Indonesia", <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2748.htm#realtions> (accessed February 20, 2010).

² Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 32.

³ Ibid, 159.

⁴ Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 160.

problem. It was now clear to the Indonesians that there was a growing extremist population within the borders of Indonesia and in order to maintain Indonesia's stability with in Southeast Asia their government was required to step up.⁵

To date, the Bali bombing remains the most lethal terrorist incident since 9/11. Since October 2002, a radical Islamic organization called Jemaah Islamiya has fought a violent terrorist campaign against Indonesia.⁶ The United States, engaged in a "Global War on Terror," has feared the threat of "another front" led by the increasing number of Islamic extremists and growing anti-American sentiment within Indonesia and throughout Southeast Asia.⁷ This anti-American sentiment has been fueled by a six-year hiatus in U.S. and Indonesian military-to-military engagements from 1999 to 2005 and other restrictions imposed by Congress that have complicated the United States ability to "win hearts and minds" of the Indonesian population.⁸ The growing threat of Islamic extremism within Indonesia, fed by years of anti-American sentiment make it critical for the United States to take deliberate steps and develop a comprehensive, enduring partnership with Indonesia.

Since 2002, Indonesian populace outrage against terrorist actions combined with aggressive police force investigations mitigated the scope of the Jemaah Islamiya terrorist threat. These actions helped to improve Indonesia's relationship with other countries in Southeast Asia. Three consecutive years without a major terrorist attack led credence to the belief that the Government of Indonesia was successfully combating terror through its

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Alan Collins, *Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 75.

⁷ Peng Claire Bei, "Terrorism and the Future of U.S. Foreign Policy in Southeast and Central Asia". *International Affairs Review* (August 2008), <http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/24> (accessed March 27, 2010).

⁸ Matthew P. Daley "U.S. Interests and policy priorities in Southeast Asia – Legislation and Policy". *DISAM Journal* (Summer 2003), http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAJ/is_4_25/ai_1-9666389 (accessed March 10, 2010).

internal legal and law enforcement agencies.⁹ However, hostile acts of Islamic extremism continued in the Palembang and North Jakarta regions demonstrating that militant networks still existed. Although the Indonesian government had taken enormous strides to counter the threat of terrorism, Islamic extremist operatives remained at large.¹⁰ On the morning of 17 July 2009, Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia fell victim to multiple attacks of Islamic extremism when suicide bombers attacked two hotels killing nine and injuring 50. Most of the victims were westerners.

These attacks prove that although the combination of new laws, anti-terror training, international cooperation, and reintegration measures have helped to mitigate the terrorist threat, Islamic Extremism is still present. This also demonstrates the United States cannot ignore this region of the world. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that the time to act is before a nation becomes a breeding ground for terrorist activity. Definitive action needs to be taken to build enduring U.S. and Indonesian relations to ensure Southeast Asia does not become the next front of the war on terror.

This paper will argue the key to countering Indonesia's potential development into a state for radical Islam is to leverage the integration of Department of Defense bilateral relations, Department of State engagement, and Non-government Organizations assistance through the use of "smart power". Smart power, a combination of hard and soft power at a carefully calculated intensity, will enable Indonesia and the United States to enhance a comprehensive partnership that is capable of providing enduring regional security and preventing a third front in the war on terror.

⁹ United States Department of State, "Country Reports on Terrorism 2008 – Indonesia" <https://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49fac681c.html> (accessed March 29, 2010).

¹⁰ Ibid

Smart: Not Hard nor Soft

The security environment of the twenty-first century is more complex than that of the Cold War. The challenges faced by the United States today require a holistic approach that makes use of the capabilities of all government agencies.¹¹ The U.S. armed forces are unrivaled in conventional power; however, the security situation of this century does not require purely military solutions. The United States needs stronger civilian organizations to fight and win against extremism ideals. Smart power is the link that matches U.S. strategies and structures to the security threat of extremism in the twenty-first century.

Smart power, an international relations phrase defined by Joseph Nye, Jr. a well-respected professor from Harvard University, is not hard nor soft, but instead the ability to combine hard and soft power into a winning strategy. Essentially smart power can be defined as the engagement of all forms of diplomacy and military force and involves the strategic use of diplomacy, persuasion, capacity building, and projection of power and influence in ways that are cost effective while maintaining political and social legitimacy.¹² The smart power approach highlights the importance of an advanced military and invests in the necessity of alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels across the United States government.¹³

According to General Anthony Zinni, “For the United States to be an effective world leader it must strategically balance all three aspects of its power – defense, diplomacy, and

¹¹ Chairman Ike Skelton, “Testimony,” House, *Building Partnership Capacity and Development of the Interagency Process: Hearing before the House Armed Service Committee*, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 2008, http://armedservice.house.gov/list/speech/armedsvc_dem/SkeltonOpeningStatement041508.shtml

¹² Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall, *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 31.

¹³ Richard L. Armitage, “Testimony,” Senate, *Implementing Smart Power: Setting an Agenda for National Security Reform: Hearing before Committee on Foreign Relations*, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 2008, 4.

development through the use of smart power.”¹⁴ Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates stated when meeting with the Indonesian Council on World Affairs, “The American and Indonesian peoples share the same principles of tolerance, pluralism, and religious freedom that Indonesia embodied in its basic charter. We held these beliefs even if, at various times in our histories, our respective governments’ actions did not always match these ideals.”¹⁵

Despite a period of nearly fifteen years of degradation by U.S. Congressional sanctions, the United States started rebuilding a cooperative relationship with Indonesia’s domestic security elements in 2005, specifically the Indonesian National Police and the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesia’s armed forces [TNI]).¹⁶ This rebuilding effort began with the relief operations after the December 26, 2004 tsunami that killed nearly 200,000 Indonesians. Since this event, the United States resumed programs to educate and reengage relationships with the highest level of Indonesia’s leadership.

The relationship between Indonesia and the United States in 2010 is positive and continues to advance. Indonesia remains a linchpin to security through the Southeast region due to its geo-strategic position astride the Straits of Malacca.¹⁷

The 2008 United States election of President Barack Obama provided the United States a new opportunity to position itself for an entirely new type of relationship with Indonesia. A relationship that uses smart power to combine military might, diplomatic efforts,

¹⁴ General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Ret) and Admiral Leighton Smith, USN(Ret), “Testimony,” Senate, *Smart Power: Building a Better, Safer World: Hearing before Committee for Foreign Relations*, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 2008, 3.

¹⁵ Secretary Robert M. Gates, (speech, Indonesian Council on World Affairs, Jakarta, Indonesia, February 25, 2008).

¹⁶Walter Lohman, “U.S. - Indonesia Relations: Build for Endurance, Not Speed,” *Backgrounder*, No. 2381 March 4, 2010.

¹⁷ John B. Haseman and Eduardo Lachica, “Getting Indonesia Right Managing a Security Partnership with a Nonallied Country,” *JFQ* 54, (3rd Quarter 2009): 87-91

educational exchanges, economic development, and more personal interaction.¹⁸ The smart power approach to strengthen relations with Indonesia is needed to help prevent the spread of Islamic Extremism in Southeast Asia.

In Iraq, General Petraeus' use of smart power to combat al Qaeda and Islamic extremism and was recognized by President George W. Bush.¹⁹ By maintaining troops on the ground after driving insurgents out of an area and working through diplomatic and other non-military means to establish local governance, rebuild infrastructure, develop and implement health care and education systems independent of al Qaeda, General Petraeus was able to turn the tide of insurgency inside Iraq.

After the December 2004 tsunami in Indonesia, smart power was demonstrated by 21 countries working together with more than 20 non-government organizations to fuse, diplomatic, military and economic efforts and bring disaster relief to thousands of tsunami victims.²⁰ However, the response to this crisis was not enduring and despite the success of smart power in the post-tsunami humanitarian assistance and disaster relief effort it receded with the floodwaters. If used effectively the United States could employ enduring smart power in it's partnership with Indonesia and efficiently build a comprehensive relationship, formed through the fusing of overlapping interagency organizations in order to combat terrorism and deter Islamic extremists organizations in Southeast Asia.²¹

Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton commented during a press conference held

¹⁸ Senator Christopher Bond, "Importance of US-Indonesian Relations" (speech, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C., 24 July 2009).

¹⁹ John J. Kruzal, "Iraq Counterinsurgency Lessons Apply to Afghanistan, Petraeus Says," *American Forces Information Service*, (Washington, DC, 11 June 2009), <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2009/06/mil-090611-afps01.htm> (accessed 23 March 2010).

²⁰ JMO Department. "Operation Unified Assistance" (Case Study). Naval War College, 2007. (NWC 3096A), (www.usnwc.edu/jmo).

²¹ Ibid

in Indonesia on her first trip as Secretary of State that, “Building a partnership, a comprehensive partnership with Indonesia is a critical step on behalf of the United States’ commitment to smart power, to listening as well as talking with those around the world, to supporting a country that has demonstrated so clearly, that Islam, democracy, and modernity not only can co-exist, but thrive together.”²²

Secretary Clinton’s statement while in Indonesia proves that the United States is taking positive steps in advancing the partnership. The speech also solidifies the Obama administration’s desire to take for action President Yudhoyono’s offer to develop a strategic partnership with the United States government.²³ The main test for both countries will be capturing the momentum of the recent promises made by high-level governmental officials and delivering demonstrable results. There must continue to be tangible progress to prove the United State’s commitment to Indonesia in developing an enduring partnership. The building process of this partnership will be like training for a marathon, it takes time and a steady pace, not speed to accomplish the goal.²⁴

Partnering through Defense, Diplomacy, and Aid

The Indonesian National Defense Force (TNI) has long been regarded as the strongest institution in Indonesia.²⁵ However, TNI’s main focus has traditionally been dealing with Indonesian politics and territorial integrity not one on multinational engagement or bilateral

²² Secretary Hillary R. Clinton, “Developing a Comprehensive Partnership with Indonesia” (speech, Jakarta, Indonesia, 18 February 2009).

²³ Bruce Vaughn, “Indonesia: Domestic Politics, Strategic Dynamics, and American Interests”, *CSR Report for Congress*, 7 August 2009, p. 5.

²⁴ Walter Lohman, “U.S. - Indonesia Relations: Build for Endurance, Not Speed,” *Backgrounders*, No. 2381, 24 March 2010.

²⁵ Secretary Robert M. Gates, (speech, Indonesian Council on World Affairs, Jakarta, Indonesia, February 25, 2008).

partnerships.²⁶ Although the influence of today's TNI on politics is much less, it is still of great concern to many.

The basis for U.S. – Indonesian military-to-military relations was transformed by the 9/11 attacks, and the global war on terror that followed. Although the Leahy Amendment and subsequent restrictions still remain in place, a strong shift has occurred in U.S. policies towards improving U.S. - Indonesia relations. Under President George W. Bush the administration agreed to expand contact and meetings between the U.S. and Indonesian militaries and to increase International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds for Indonesia. In return Jakarta approved U.S. aircraft use of Indonesian air space for over-flight in support of operations in Afghanistan and increased security for U.S. personnel in Indonesia.

With the normalization of military relations between the United States and Indonesia beginning in 2005, United States Pacific Command made deliberate steps to upgrade current ties. Military-to-military engagement increased significantly in 2007 with the most noteworthy events being GARUDA SHIELD and Southeast Asia Disaster Management. GARUDA SHIELD, a peace keeping focused, brigade-level exercise used to enhance Indonesia's role in global peacekeeping operations. Southeast Asia Disaster Management Conference, a multilateral, multi-agency exercise examined the progress made by Indonesia's government to respond to a disaster at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.²⁷ In addition, Indonesia began developing its own peace keeping operations center based on the United States Peace Keeping Course through the US Global Peace Keeping Initiative.

²⁶ Bruce Vaughn, "Indonesia: Domestic Politics, Strategic Dynamics, and American Interests", *CSR Report for Congress*, 7 August 2009, p. 5.

²⁷ Timothy Keating, "Testimony," Senate, *U.S. Pacific Command Posture: Hearing before the Armed Services Committee*, 113th Cong., 1st sess., 2009, 25.

In 2008, Indonesia partnered with U.S. Pacific Command to co-host the Pacific Army Management Seminar and the Chiefs of Defense Conference in Bali – proving Indonesia’s confidence that the country’s counter-terrorism measures were secure enough to welcome all the Chiefs of Defense for the Pacific Region to the site where the most deadly attack since 9/11 took place. Both events occurred without any type of hostile attack and were greatly successful.²⁸

In 2009, Indonesian leadership continued to enhance their engagement through more complex interactions within the U.S. Pacific Commander's theater campaign plan activities. Indonesia agreed to co-host the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative Capstone Exercise and took a leading role in the first Association Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief activity, which included twenty-seven nations and the ARF Voluntary Display of Requirements (VDR).²⁹ Presently, Indonesia is the second largest recipient of U.S. security assistance in the region. Indonesian officers are returning to the United States for professional military education and the United States currently has U.S. service members enrolled in all of Indonesia’s command and staff schools.³⁰

According to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, terrorism is a central threat that the two militaries must partner to defeat. The greatest dividend of the U.S. – Indonesia partnership to date is the TNI’s success in the counterterrorism front. Indonesian authorities overcame the risk of angering Islamic groups and captured more than 400 Islamic extremists

²⁸ Takahashi, Yamamoto (COMPACFLT Southeast Asia Desk Officer), interview by the author, 31 March 2010.

²⁹ Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 32.

³⁰ John B. Haseman and Eduardo Lachica, “Getting Indonesia Right Managing a Security Partnership with a Nonallied Country,” JFQ 54, (3rd Quarter 2009): 87-91

suspected of being terrorists. This success was facilitated by training arranged through the U.S. Embassy political military liaison office and is an example of the use of smart power to further develop United States - Indonesia relations and counter extremism.³¹

Hostage rescue and Non-combat evacuation operations are areas in which Indonesian forces lack proficiency and would benefit significantly from U.S. military training.³² Currently the Obama administration is seeking to reverse a 12-year old ban on training Indonesia's Kopassus, an elite unit convicted of severe human rights abuse dating back to 1998. Four members of the force traveled to Washington, D.C. in March 2010 to discuss the proposal. After a meeting between Admiral Robert F. Willard, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command and Indonesia's defense minister, Purnomo Yusgiantoro in February 2010, Yusgiantoro predicted that the training would resume.³³ In 2008 the Bush administration made attempts to resume training with Kopassus, but the State Department advised against it. Since then, human rights training of Indonesian forces is administered by the U.S. Department of Justice and will continue until the Special Forces training ban can be repealed.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton signified the importance of the Indonesia-United States partnership when she said, "...It is no accident that on my first trip as Secretary of State I've come to this country." In her visit to Indonesia Secretary Clinton showed that the United States Department of State was ready to put into action the promises it had made for a comprehensive partnership. The U.S. – Indonesia bilateral agreement provides the proper framework required for advancing common concerns between the two countries.

³¹ Timothy Keating, "Testimony," Senate, *U.S. Pacific Command Posture: Hearing before the Armed Services Committee*, 113th Cong., 1st sess., 2009, 25.

³² John Pomfret, "US floats plan to lift ban on training Indonesia's Kopassus unit," *The Washington Post*, 3 March 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/02/AR20100304053.html> (accessed 31 March 2010)

³³ Ibid

During that same visit in early 2009 Secretary Clinton announced a ten million dollar initiative to promote bilateral education initiatives.³⁴

The U.S. Embassy to Indonesia's Mission Strategic Plan calls for United State's support of Indonesia's regional peace and security capacities.³⁵ The FY 2010 State Department budget justification for foreign operations states that the United States will support Indonesia's role as an emerging leader in regional security due to its success in combating terrorism.

Through support from the United States Department of State and especially the country team at the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia has been able to participate in a fellowship program for regional defense to counter terrorism. The country team provides civil-military and intelligence cooperation in the fight to combat Islamic extremism. The United States Government's assistance to Indonesia is directly related to the role that Indonesia is playing in the war against terror in Southeast Asia. Through U.S. and Australian funding, Special Detachment 88 (*Detasemen Khusus 88*) was created out of the Indonesian National Police to be the Indonesian counter-terrorism squad. The unit has had considerable success against jihadist cells linked to the Islamist movement Jemaah Islamiyah.

Facilitated by the United States Department of Justice, Indonesia has adapted a form of law enforcement that is a very unique approach to countering terrorism. In addition to Department of Justice training for prosecutors and judges in counterterrorist law, a significant effort has been made to care for the families of terrorists that have been

³⁴ Bruce Vaughn, "Indonesia: Domestic Politics, Strategic Dynamics, and American Interests", *CSR Report for Congress*, 7 August 2009, p. 5.

³⁵ U.S. Mission to Indonesia, FY 2011 Mission Strategic Plan, (Jakarta, Indonesia: U.S. Mission to Indonesia, 15 Apr 2009), 8. Sensitive but Unclassified document.

incarcerated. Supporting the families is an incentive for terrorists to reform themselves.³⁶

Smart power in the form of interagency cooperation was successfully demonstrated in coordinated efforts to improve Indonesia's capacity to defend its own borders. Through Department of State training of Indonesian police forces, Defense Department funding for radar sites, and Department of Justice training of law enforcement officials, Indonesia has significantly improved both capacity and capability to ensure security in the littorals.³⁷

Obstacles to Overcome

Although many United States officials and the President himself have stated that there is a need now for a stronger, more comprehensive partnership between Indonesia and the United States, the waters between the two countries is still muddied from lingering sanctions against United States assistance to Indonesia. These restrictions sponsored by Senator Leahy of Vermont were intended to punish the TNI officials for committing human right violations in East Timor in 1991 as well as militia violence that occurred after riots in August 1999.

The origin of the Leahy Amendments and embargo against United States government involvement with Indonesia was to assert the primacy of human rights in U.S. foreign policy and serve as punishment to the TNI for the violence committed against Timorese citizens for voting for independence and the murder of two Americans in Papua. Advocates for continuing the Leahy Amendments argue that waiving these Congressional restrictions will prevent future legislation from being taken seriously. If there are not consequences for such

³⁶ U.S. Department of Justice, *International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program*, Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2009-2013 (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, January 2009), 31.

³⁷ The United States-Indonesia Society, *The 2009 U.S. – Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership: Engaging the Non-Governmental Sector*, USINDO Conference Findings (Washington, DC, April 2009), 24-29).

a vividly clear case of human rights violations as the TNI's abuse of the Timorese, then the United States ability to dissuade future human rights violators will be diminished.

Additionally, overturning these Congressional restrictions has great potential to send a signal that the U.S. resolve to improve human rights is less important than military objectives to combat terrorism.

Addressing the former concern first, the six-year hiatus of military relations between the United States and Indonesia left the Indonesian armed forces crippled and unable to respond with appropriate disaster relief to the 2004 tsunami off the island of Aceh. Since lifting the embargo, the TNI has been able to receive spare parts for much of the Indonesian Air Force's aircraft and their Navy has been able to reactivate much of its fleet. The 2004 tsunami relief effort proved to the world how effective U.S. sanctions to reform human rights policies could be and the consequences for state sponsored human rights violations.

Conclusions

President Obama and President Yudhoyono are both eager to broaden the level of engagement between the United States and Indonesia. President Yudhoyono believes that a strategic partnership with the United States must be one based on common interest and equal partnership. Respecting Indonesia's current independent foreign policy is a requirement the Obama administration must follow to permit development of a successful comprehensive partnership.

Groundwork for a comprehensive partnership between the two countries was laid when the Bush Administration overcame complicated circumstances and restrictions. The

process of developing the basis of the partnership between the two countries has taken several years and yet multiple complications still exist. The establishment of a comprehensive partnership will take many more years of cooperation and use smart power on common interests to permit the U.S. – Indonesia relationship to fully transform and fully counter terrorism in Southeast Asia.

The first challenge that the United States must overcome to further its current partnership with Indonesia is to re-evaluate the legacy constraints regarding human rights that the United States placed on Indonesia in the late 1990s.

Re-evaluation of legislation restricting those groups accused of human rights violation is required to identify who is truly permitted to receive United States military training. In order to further the partnership in combating extremism, training of Kopassus must return. Currently legislation is interpreted so that no member of the Indonesian Special Forces is able to receive any training although a majority of members are too young to have been in the armed forces when the human rights violations occurred.

Indonesian Detachment 88 has been highly successful in countering terrorism throughout the country. However, the detachment is elite and very small in numbers. Indonesia needs the numbers of Detachment 88 to increase or at least the skill set to broaden across the police force in order to sustain continued operations against Islamic extremism.

Whether training occurs with the Indonesian Special Forces or Detachment 88, the requirement to increase the skill level in rescuing hostages captured by extremist is one that will benefit not only Indonesian citizens but foreign nationals as they travel throughout the Indonesian archipelago.

To advance a comprehensive partnership with the United States, Indonesian government officials need to demonstrate their resolve to basic human rights. The names of those convicted of 1991 and 1999 human right violations should be published and appropriately punished.

As Secretary Clinton said during her visit to Indonesia, “Building a partnership, a comprehensive partnership with Indonesia is a critical step on behalf of the United States’ commitment to smart power, to listening as well as talking with those around the world, to supporting a country that has demonstrated so clearly that Islam, democracy, and modernity can exist.”³⁸ With the use of smart power and the development of a comprehensive partnership, the United States and Indonesia can defeat extremism and prevent a third front in the War on Terror.

Recommendations

The three areas that need action taken in order for smart power to be implemented in the development of a comprehensive partnership are re-evaluation of legislation constraints, increase training and education of agencies across the Indonesian government, and furthering of counter-terrorism measures.

The Leahy amendment, originally implemented and developed by the United States should be examined to see if it is still legitimate and appropriate for the reasons it was originally enacted.

The United States currently has a training program that maintains methods to enhance the professional education of members across the interagency to enhance education.

³⁸ Secretary Hillary R. Clinton, “Developing a Comprehensive Partnership with Indonesia” (speech, Jakarta, Indonesia, 18 February 2009).

Indonesia would benefit greatly if it made available interagency training opportunities across all branches of government, such as the Indonesian Department of Justice or Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Implementing an international fellowship at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) could benefit Indonesian humanitarian assistance and disaster relief plans.

With the United States already involved in a two-front war against extremism there is a vast interest to contain terrorism and do what it can to further training and programs that focus on prevention of terrorist activity and maintain peace throughout the Indonesian archipelago. The United States Department of State should continue to partner with the Department of Justice and further the training and funding of Detachment 88. The Department of Defense and Department of State should work together to further Indonesia's ability to counter extremism by resuming special training of the Indonesian Special Forces command.

The opportunities are nearly endless, but there are obstacles to overcome. With the proper calculated use of smart power the United States can take the current bilateral relationship with Indonesia and with a pace destined to go the miles, hurdle those barriers that will allow a successful enduring comprehensive partnership to effectively combat extremism and prevent the opening of the third front in the war on terror.

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